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THERE IS NOTHING THAT
INTERPRETATION JUST IS
Cass R. Sunstein*
I. THE THESIS
Many people believe that the Constitution must be
interpreted in their preferred way. They insist that the very idea
of interpretation requires judges to adopt their own method of
1
construing the founding document.
The problem with this view is that in the legal context, there
2
is nothing that interpretation “just is.” Among the reasonable
alternatives, no approach to constitutional interpretation is
mandatory. Any approach must be defended on normative
grounds—not asserted as part of what interpretation requires by
its nature. Whatever their preferred approach, both judges and
3
lawyers must rely on normative judgments of their own.
Nonetheless, they sometimes claim that their own approach is
necessary, in the sense that they have no choice but to adopt it, if
they are to engage in interpretation at all. That claim is a recipe
for confusion.
It is true that some imaginable practices cannot count as
interpretation at all. If judges do not show fidelity to authoritative
texts, they cannot claim to be interpreting them. But without
transgressing the legitimate boundaries of interpretation, judges
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. I am grateful to
Larry Alexander, Eric Posner, Frederick Schauer, Lawrence Solum, David Strauss, and
Mark Tushnet for invaluable comments on a previous draft. Special thanks to Solum for
particularly detailed and illuminating suggestions, from which I have learned a great deal.
This essay expands on the discussion in chapter 1 of CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION
OF MANY MINDS (2011), but there are significant changes in the central argument.
1. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism (Working Paper No. 08067 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1235722;
Walter Benn Michaels, A Defense of Old Originalism, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 21, 21
(2009).
2. The interpretation-construction distinction complicates this basic claim; for
discussion, see below.
3. This is so even if those implicit judgments direct them to defer to, or to accept,
the normative judgments of other people. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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can show fidelity to texts in a variety of ways. Within those
boundaries, the choice among possible approaches depends on
the claim that it makes our constitutional system better rather
than worse. Importantly, this conclusion does not, by itself, rule
out any of the established approaches, including originalism in its
4
5
6
various forms, democracy-reinforcement, “moral readings,”
7
8
minimalism, or broad deference to political processes. But it
9
does establish the terrain on which the debates must be
10
undertaken.
II. ON THE VERY IDEA OF INTERPRETATION
A. ORIGINAL INTENTIONS
Consider one view: In interpreting the meaning of words, we
ask about authorial intentions. (I use the term “author” to include
speakers as well as writers.) That is what it means to interpret
words.
It is true that in ordinary life, we tend to interpret words in
11
this way. If a friend asks you to meet her at “my favorite
restaurant,” you will probably ask what, exactly, she had in mind.
You will not ask which restaurant you like best, or which
restaurant is preferred by your favorite restaurant critic. It might
even be consistent with ordinary usage to say that in ordinary
4.
5.
6.

See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1983).
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
7. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
8. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012);
Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). See also Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (making a contingent argument against judicial
review, in part on consequentialist grounds).
9. The valuable discussion in Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of
Formalism: False Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2014),
can be understood to sketch a consequence-focused argument for originalism and plain
meaning approaches to legal texts. See also JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B.
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013).
10. My focus throughout is on constitutional interpretation, but it should be plain
that the same analysis applies to statutory interpretation as well. For instructive and
sympathetic discussions of textualism, see John F. Manning, Second-Generation
Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (2010); John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative
Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419 (2005). For a prominent rejection of textualism, see STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005).
11. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989).
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conversational settings, interpretation of people’s words amounts
12
to an effort to elicit their intentions. Of course, this conclusion
invites attention to context and purposes, not just words. If a
friend makes some kind of linguistic error, we would not want to
hold her to those words. But when we depart from her words, it is
because we are trying to figure out what she had in mind.
Some people think that legal interpretation is not
fundamentally different. In their view, a form of originalism,
based on the idea of authorial intention, is built into the concept
of interpretation. For example, Larry Alexander writes that
given what we accept as legally authoritative, the proper way
to interpret the Constitution . . . is to seek its authors’ intended
meanings—the same thing we do when we read a letter from
Mom, a shopping list from our spouse, or instructions for how
13
to assemble a child’s toy made in China.

Walter Benn Michaels goes even further:
In fact, however, you can’t do textual interpretation without
some appeal to authorial intention and, perhaps more
controversially, you can’t (coherently and nonarbitrarily) think
of yourself as still doing textual interpretation as soon as you
appeal to something beyond authorial intention—for example,
14
the original public meaning or evolving principles of justice.

It is true that we could define legal interpretation in this way.
But if Alexander and Michaels are using “interpretation” in the
15
standard legal sense, the definition would be a stipulation, and it
would not be based on the necessary meaning of the term. Let us
suppose that in ordinary conversation, most people understand
the idea of interpretation to involve a search for authorial
intentions. Even in that context, such an understanding is not
mandatory; we could imagine the view that interpretation
involves a search for public meaning, rather than authorial
16
intentions. But it is certainly sensible to say that in conversation,

12. See id.
13. Alexander, supra note 1, at 1.
14. See Michaels, supra note 1, at 21. For an analogous argument, see STEVEN D.
SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004); for an analogous argument with a focus on meaning
rather than intentions, see Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85
GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997). For an instructive discussion, also with an emphasis on meaning,
see Lawrence Solum, Semantic Originalism (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.
15. Alexander, supra note 1, does offer a nonstipulative argument, taken up below.
16. It is true, however, that such an approach would make conversation work less
well, at least if it is too literal. Some science fiction characters apply this method to
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we ask about intentions. If this is indeed sensible, it is for a
pragmatic reason; the goal of the particular communication will
not be met if we do not. When a friend asks me to meet her, or to
do something for her, I am likely to ask about her intentions,
because I want to meet her or to do as she would like. If my friend
says that we should “meet at the best restaurant in town,” I will
likely ask what she meant by those words. It is imaginable, of
course, that she wants me to do a little work and to see what the
restaurant critics like best—but if so, I am still trying to follow her
subjective intentions. If interpretation entails that practice, it is
because in the relevant context, that is the best way to understand
the term.
The same things might be said about communication within
some hierarchical organization. If a supervisor tells an employee
what to do, it is right to think that in ordinary circumstances, the
employee ought to ask: “What, exactly, did my supervisor mean
by that?” (The qualification “in ordinary circumstances” is
necessary because even subordinates sometimes ask about
something other than speaker’s intentions; everything depends on
the role of the subordinate, some of whom might have a different
or less deferential role.) The employee asks this question, if he
does, for pragmatic reasons. Employees should generally follow
the instructions of their supervisors, and the practice of following
instructions, in hierarchical organizations, usually calls for close
attention to the supervisors’ subjective intentions. It is plausible
to say that in some contexts, interpretation of the instructions of
a supervisor “just is” an effort to elicit and follow subjective
intentions—not in the sense that this understanding of
interpretation is inevitable or strictly mandatory, but in the sense
that it captures how most people use the term in such contexts. If
that is true, it is because this understanding of interpretation
makes the supervisor-employee relationship work best.
A possible response would be that at least in many contexts,
it is not even possible to interpret people’s words without making
some kind of judgment about the author’s intentions. On this
view, the idea of meaning depends on some such judgment, and it
is incoherent without it. In the legal context, this claim is plainly
17
false, for reasons that are elaborated below.
unfortunate effect; consider Data in the television series Star Trek: The Next Generation.
“Nerd humor” often consists of the use of public meaning, rather than intentions.
17. There is a question whether it is false even in ordinary communications. Suppose
that you look up at a pattern of clouds in the sky. To your surprise, the pattern spells out
the word “God.” Whether or not you have faith, you will have no hesitation identifying
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B. ORIGINAL MEANING
One conception of interpretation involves a search for
speaker’s intentions, and in ordinary life, that is the most common
conception. But it is easy to think of cases in which interpretation
does not operate by reference to such intentions. In fact some of
the most committed originalists, including Justice Scalia himself,
believe that what matters is the original public meaning of the
18
document, not intentions at all. In Heller, for example, Justice
Scalia wrote that in “interpreting [the Second Amendment], we
are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to
be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
19
meaning.’” In his view, “[N]ormal meaning may of course
include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in
20
the founding generation.”
Originalists themselves argue fiercely about whether the
original meaning, or instead the original intentions, should be
21
taken as authoritative —a point that suggests that interpretation,
to qualify as such, need not be focused on intentions. Those who
focus on original public meaning argue that meaning is objective,
not subjective. In their view, what matters is the standard
understanding among the Constitution’s ratifiers, not what the
authors “intended.” After all, the ratifiers (“We the People”), and
not the authors, turned the Constitution into law. Rejecting
subjective intentions, Justice Holmes wrote, “[W]e do not inquire
22
what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statutes mean.”
that word. Conventions about language may be sufficient for the identification, suggesting
the possibility that we can understand the meanings of words by reference to those
conventions, without necessarily making judgments about author’s intentions. This
example is contested in Steven Smith’s Law’s Quandary, supra note 14.
18. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Grice similarly
distinguishes between “speaker’s meaning” and “sentence meaning.” See H. P. Grice,
Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word Meaning, 4 Found. Language 225, 225
(1968).
19. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576.
20. Id. at 576–77.
21. See Michaels, supra note 1; Lawson, supra note 14; Solum, supra note 14.
22. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417 (1899). See Solum, supra note 14, at 5: “The argument for clause meaning will be
elaborated at length, but the intuitive idea is simple. The constitution was drafted and
ratified by a multitude: many different individuals at different times and places. The
intentional mental states of the multitude with respect to a given constitutional provision
(their purposes, hopes, fears, expectations, and so forth) will themselves be multitudinous
and inaccessible. Multitudinous, because different framers and ratifiers had different
intentions, with the consequence that intentions alone cannot fix consistent
(noncontradictory and not radically ambiguous) semantic content. Inaccessible, because

INTERPRETATION_FINAL DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE)

198

6/26/2015 2:45 PM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:193

Of course those who insist on adherence to the original public
23
meaning count as originalists —but they do not rely on subjective
24
intentions. At this point, my goal is not to take a stand on which
form of originalism is best or most coherent, or to suggest that the
25
original meaning must be taken as fixed and binding. (The very
26
idea has more than one meaning. ) It is only to insist that a
prominent understanding of originalism—as involving public
meaning rather than intentions—is enough to demonstrate that
attention to subjective intentions is not built into the very idea of
27
interpretation.
C. CONSEQUENCES
Is it plausible to say that interpretation necessarily entails a
28
search for the original public meaning? Not at all. Alexander is
right to suggest that interpretation often involves an inquiry into
intentions rather than public meaning. (Recall that if your friend
says, “let’s go to the best movie now playing,” you ask what she
has in mind, not what is generally recognized as best, unless that
those who were expected to engage in constitutional practice (the judges, officials, and
citizens of the United States of American [sic] for an indefinite future) would have found
the multitudinous intentions epistemically inaccessible.” Solum adds: “The possibility of
constitutional communication was created by the fact that the framers and ratifiers could
rely on the accessibility of the public meaning (or conventional semantic meaning) of the
words, phrases, and clauses that constitute the Constitution. Not only can such public
meanings enable constitutional communication at the time a given constitutional
provisions is drafted, approved, and first implemented, such meanings can also become
stable over time or be recovered if they are lost. In other words, under normal conditions
successful constitutional communication requires reliance by the drafters, ratifiers, and
interpreters on the original public meaning of the words and phrases.” Id.
23. For a valuable discussion, see Solum, supra note 14.
24. See Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U. L.
REV. 687 (2006), and in particular this suggestion, as against an advocate of authorial
intention: “Smith confuses, it seems to me, the question whether words convey a concept
from one intelligent mind to another (communication) with the question whether words
produce a concept in the person who reads or hears them (meaning). The bridegroom who
says ‘I do,’ intending by that expression to mean ‘I do not,’ has not succeeded in
communicating his intent; but what he has said unquestionably means that he consents to
marriage.” Id. at 691.
25. In a detailed and instructive discussion, Lawrence Solum urges, “The core of the
affirmative case for the Fixation Thesis is rooted in commonsense intuitions about the
meaning of old texts of all kinds.” Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of
Historical Fact in Original Meaning 28 (Feb. 3, 2015) (unpublished manuscript). One
question is the weight to be given to those “common sense intuitions.” In my view, the
answer is normative; it cannot emerge simply by recognizing what those intuitions are.
26. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
27. See Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44 San Diego L. Rev. 123 (2007),
and in particular Solum’s suggestion: “Constitutional text messages will work best if they
are constructed from widely shared public meanings.” Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
28. I am putting to one side the interpretation-construction discussion, discussed
below.
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is what she has in mind.) We could also imagine a form of
textualism that inquiries about contemporary meaning—thus
calling for adherence to the current, rather than the historical,
meaning of the constitutional text. To their credit, many of those
who insist on fidelity to the original meaning do not insist that
their own view is compelled by the very idea of interpretation.
Instead they suggest that their own approach would lead to better
29
consequences.
For example, Justice Scalia stresses the risks associated with
judicial discretion, and he contends that if judges adhere to
original meaning, those risks will be diminished, because judges
30
will be constrained. Some originalists focus on the goal of
democratic self-government, and they argue that if judges respect
the original meaning, they will promote that goal. Consider the
illuminating suggestion by Randy Barnett: “Given a sufficiently
good constitutional text, originalists maintain that better results
will be reached overall if government officials—including
judges—must stick to the original meaning rather than
empowering them to trump that meaning with one that they
31
prefer.” This is an explicit argument that the case for originalism
32
depends on what will produce “better results” overall.
Of special importance here is Barnett’s emphasis on the need
for a “sufficiently good constitutional text,” understood in light of
the original meaning. Suppose that the constitutional text, taken
only as such, is good, or good enough. But suppose that it is a great
deal worse if it is understood in light of its original meaning.
Imagine, for example, that it is hopelessly undemocratic, or that it
entrenches racial injustice. If so, the argument for sticking with
the original meaning would be weakened. In fact this is not an
implausible account of the American Constitution. The text itself
contains broadly appealing phrases, protecting “the freedom of
speech” and guaranteeing “due process of law” and “the equal
protection of the laws,” and vesting executive power in “a
president of the United States.” There is a good argument that if
these words were construed in accordance with their original

29. See Scalia, supra note 4; MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 9.
30. Scalia, supra note 4.
31. Randy Barnett & Cass Sunstein, Constitution in Exile? (May 2, 2005) (debate),
available at http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp.
32. See also Lawson, supra note 14, at 1836 (“It is highly improbable that any
plausible argument for the Constitution’s authority can be made that does not, at least to
some extent, depend on the Constitution’s substance.”).
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meaning, understood in terms of its expected applications, 33 our
34
constitutional order would be far worse than it is today.
True, we should agree that judges should be faithful to the
text itself, even if the text were not as good as it is. If judges were
not faithful to the text, it is fair to say that they would not be
35
engaged in interpretation at all. If judges disregard authoritative
texts, they cannot claim to be interpreting them. In that sense, the
idea of interpretation does impose constraints on what judges may
do. Moreover, legal systems do much better—and even count as
36
legal systems —if judges are faithful to authoritative texts. If they
37
do not, the rule of law is itself in jeopardy, because judges would
appear to be empowered to do whatever they want. In that sense,
there is an excellent consequentialist argument in favor of taking
38
constitutional texts as binding. But under the assumptions I have
given, why should judges stick not merely with the text but also
with its original meaning? If the consequences of sticking with it
would be terrible, and if those consequences could be avoided
with another approach, shouldn’t judges consider that other
approach?
These questions are not meant to be rhetorical; they suggest
only that various approaches to interpretation are on the table.
Many originalists find it both appropriate and necessary to argue
39
that the consequences of their approach would not be terrible.
40
With Barnett, they urge that those consequences would be good.
33. I am bracketing the question whether that is the right way to understand them.
The only suggestion is that there is a strong argument against originalism if, understood in
a certain way, it makes our constitutional system worse. It remains possible that some
understandings of originalism would not have that effect.
34. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
35. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95 (2010).
36. Cf. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
37. For the best discussion, see Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210 (1979).
38. This conclusion is not meant to address the question whether and when it is
legitimate to construe the text in a way that does not quite fit its words, as in the claim that
the first amendment (“Congress shall make no law abridging”) applies to all of the national
government, and not merely Congress. Nor am I suggesting that consequentialism is the
only way to choose among possible approaches to interpretation. See supra note 32.
39. We could imagine an argument that does not make a particular claim about what
interpretation is, and that does not rest on consequences, but that invokes moral or
political legitimacy. Such a claim might point in originalist or nonoriginalist directions. On
the latter, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). I do not believe that arguments
of this kind are promising, but I will simply bracket them here; they should be taken to be
claims about what makes our constitutional order best, in the relevant sense.
40. See the subtle argument in Solum, supra note 9, which can be read to suggest a
consequentialist argument in favor of originalism, stressing the virtues of stability and
predictability.
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They contend that their approach fits with a great deal of existing
judicial doctrine, or at least with those aspects of it that seem least
41
dispensable. Few contemporary originalists are willing to
concede that under their approach, racial segregation is
constitutionally acceptable—even though nothing in the original
meaning bans segregation by the national government, and even
though it is not at all easy to show that the Constitution bans
segregation at the state level. Few contemporary originalists agree
that their approach would allow the national government to
prohibit women from working for the federal civil service, or
would freely allow states to discriminate against women.
On the contrary, originalists tend either to say little about the
difficulty in squaring their approach with foundational
commitments of the contemporary constitutional order, or to
insist that the difficulty is not so severe, because originalism
42
already embodies those commitments. Some originalists work
43
extremely hard to try to demonstrate that point. They are right
to do so, because the argument for their approach depends on that
work. Whether or not that argument is convincing, what is
noteworthy is that many of those who stress original meaning find
it necessary to stress these points about consequences. They do
not rest content with, or even make, the claim that their approach
is built into the very idea of interpretation.
Indeed, some originalists, notably Jack Balkin, insist that
certain provisions of of the Constitution are written in general and
abstract terms, which allows accommodation of evolving
44
understandings. Some people who hold this view contend that
the original understanding was that the Constitution creates
broad principles whose concrete meaning would not be frozen in
45
time. If their claim is about the intended meaning, or about the
public meaning, it is not clear that they are right; the evidence is
46
ambiguous here. But if they are, the line between originalism
47
and other approaches starts to dissolve, because interpretation
41. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA.
L. REV. 947 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v.
Virginia (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://scholarlycommons.law. northwestern.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1205&context=facultyworkingpapers.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See BALKIN, supra note 26.
45. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885 (1985).
46. See id.; Solum, supra note 25; cf. Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s
Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1989).
47. BALKIN, supra note 26.
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of abstractions—what counts as “equal protection” or “the
freedom of speech”—squarely invites the exercise of discretion on
the part of the judges. And if Balkin’s view of interpretation is
correct, my main conclusion holds: It is not because of anything
intrinsic to the idea, but because its adoption would make our
constitutional system better rather than worse.
D. FIT AND JUSTIFICATION
I have emphasized that the concept of interpretation does
impose constraints. Some approaches cannot qualify as
interpretation at all. Even if it would be good, pragmatically
speaking, to substitute the best imaginable constitution for our
own constitution, the substitution cannot count as interpretation.
But the concept of interpretation does not compel any form of
originalism.
Let us now turn to nonoriginalist approaches. Suppose a
judge thinks that where the Constitution is vague or opentextured, he should interpret it to make the democratic process
48
work as well as it possibly can—an idea that John Hart Ely and
49
Justice Breyer have vigorously championed. Is that approach
ruled off-limits by the very idea of interpretation? It is hard to see
why. Justice Breyer has argued that a democracy-protective
approach, honoring “active liberty,” fits with the text and
purposes of the document even if it does not fit with the original
50
meaning, narrowly conceived. (Recall that some originalists
think that the Constitution was deliberately written in broad
terms whose meaning was meant to evolve over time.) Breyer’s
approach must be evaluated on its merits; it cannot be ruled off
the table. To his credit, Breyer is candid about this point, and
contends that the consequences of his preferred approach would
51
be good.
The same is true for Dworkin’s preferred view, which is that
the Constitution should be taken to include abstractions that
invite moral reasoning from judges, and that judges must give
52
those generalities the best moral readings that they can. Indeed,

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

ELY, supra note 5.
See BREYER, supra note 10.
See id.
See id.
See DWORKIN, supra note 6 or 39.
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both the Lochner Court 53 and the Warren Court 54 approached the
Constitution in this way, and many people, on both the right and
the left, think the Court should resume something like this
55
approach today. Whether or not it is the right approach, it would
certainly count as interpretation within permissible linguistic
understandings of the term.
Dworkin has argued that legal interpretation involves two
56
obligations. The first obligation is one of “fit”; an interpreter
cannot simply ignore the materials that are being interpreted. The
second is one of “justification.” What Dworkin means is that
within the constraints of fit, an interpreter must justify the existing
57
legal materials in the sense of making them the best that they can
be. To explain this approach, Dworkin offers the arresting
58
analogy of a chain novel. Suppose that you are the fifth writer in
a chain, and that your task is to write the fifth chapter. Four
writers have written four chapters before you. In writing the fifth
chapter, you must write the novel that others have started, and
not another. You cannot make up a whole new novel. Nor can you
depart from what has come before, in the sense of producing a
narrative that ignores it or makes it unintelligible or random. But
you might well think that you have an obligation to make the
novel good rather than terrible, and your authorship of the next
chapter will be undertaken with that obligation in mind.
Dworkin is right to observe that at least in a case system,
judicial judgments often seem a lot like that. It is generally agreed
that in the American constitutional system, judges who interpret
the Constitution owe a duty of fidelity to what has come before
59
(subject to the relevant theory of mistake). But they also have a
degree of discretion. They can turn the tale in one direction or
another. If, for example, the question is whether the Constitution
requires states to recognize same-sex marriage, they must ask:
53. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
54. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S.
533 (1964).
55. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014) seems to me in this vein.
56. DWORKIN, supra note 39.
57. I am bracketing for the moment the question whether those materials are limited
to authoritative texts or whether they include (for example) previous judicial
interpretations.
58. See DWORKIN, supra note 39. Of course there are diverse conceptions of what a
novel is—of how it might be written and of how the various parts fit together. Dworkin is
assuming a conventional conception, associated with nineteenth-century novels.
59. I mean to bracket the question of how much weight judges should accord to
precedents.
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What approach makes the best sense out of the existing materials?
Of course it is true that an emphasis on fit and justification leaves
many questions open. A recurring question is the relationship
among the case law, social practices, and the original
understanding of the text; what does the obligation of fit mean
60
when these point in different directions? Different answers to
that question are admissible within the general concept of
interpretation. Democracy-reinforcement is one attempt to
answer; so is originalism, focused as it is on the authoritative text
and original understandings.
On the basis of Dworkin’s argument, we might be tempted to
think (as Dworkin does) that there is one thing that legal
interpretation just is: an attempt to ensure both fit and
justification. And it is true that originalists and moral readers,
minimalists and democracy-reinforcers, those who insist on a
presumption of constitutionality—all of these, and more, can
accept the view that both fit and justification matter. But the
temptation should be resisted. While Dworkin’s approach is one
conception of interpretation, it is not the only one. If we believe
that interpretation involves the search for authorial intentions, we
will not much care about justification. We will attempt to identify
a fact: What did the author(s) intend? It is true that the answer to
that question might be difficult to find, and it is also true that there
may be no answer to that question. But if so, we may have
exhausted the act of interpretation. (Something similar can be
said about those who emphasize the original public meaning.) At
least that is one view (again, not the only one) of what
interpretation is.
E. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
With a point of this kind in mind, some people have insisted
on the importance of making a distinction between
61
“interpretation” and “construction.” In an especially clear and
illuminating discussion, Lawrence Solum suggests that
interpretation attempts to discover the linguistic or semantic
meaning of a legal text, whereas construction gives legal effect to
62
that meaning. The First Amendment, for example, has a
60. See N.L.R.B. v. Canning, 573 U.S. _ (2014), where the justices divided on
answering that question.
61. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).
62. See Solum, supra note 35. As Solum emphasizes, the distinction has a long history
and has been understood in several different ways.
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linguistic meaning (“no law abridging”), and no one can argue
that the linguistic meaning is identical to various first amendment
doctrines (the public forum doctrine, the lower level of protection
accorded to commercial advertising, the exclusion of bribery, the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions). Solum urges that interpretation “is guided by
63
linguistic facts—facts about patterns of usage,” and is in that
64
sense value-free or only “thinly normative,” in the sense that our
normative views about what the law should be do not determine
whether an interpretation is correct.
By contrast, “theories of construction are ultimately
normative,” in the sense that a judgment on behalf of one
construction rather than another turns on “premises that go
65
beyond linguistic facts.” In Solum’s terminology, an approach
that favors deference to the political process is a theory of
construction; it is unquestionably normative, but it does not allow
judges to enlist their own moral or political beliefs in particular
cases. When linguistic meaning of a text is vague (as it seems for
many constitutional provisions), then the fact that judges are
involved in construction, rather than interpretation, seems
obvious. On Solum’s view, interpretation gives rise to a
66
“construction zone.” For judges who find themselves in that
zone, there are many ways to proceed; deference to the political
process is merely one.
If we accept this distinction, then we might say that there is
nothing that construction just is, because construction cannot
occur without some kind of normative argument, and because
several (or many) normative arguments are consistent with the
basic idea of construction. But on this view, there is something
that interpretation just is, which is the elicitation of linguistic
meaning. For this reason, some version of textualism —in Solum’s
67
own account, one that is rooted in the original public meaning —
is a necessary foundation for interpretation. The word “speech,”
for example, cannot mean “Mars” or “President” or “horse” or
“flood” or “ketchup,” and the words “due process” cannot mean
“with pancakes” or “American slavery” or “long-burning
candle.” In the eighteenth century, the word “goal” meant “jail,”

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 104.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Solum, supra note 14.
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and if we read an eighteenth-century legal text using that word,
we might well insist on the original public meaning to interpret it.
As Solum acknowledges, however, there are different
approaches to the identification of linguistic meaning. Original
intention and original meaning are two, and it would also be
possible (whether or not reasonable) to identify such meaning by
pointing to contemporary understandings. In the case of an
eighteenth-century text with the word “goal,” we would be drawn
to some form of the originalism. (The same is true of the words
68
“domestic violence” in the Constitution. ) Interpretation,
understood as the search for linguistic meaning, can be treated as
an important or even as the critical part of “fit”—and it is
distinctive because it fastens on the obligation to attend to the
semantic meaning of authoritative texts.
If the distinction between interpretation and construction is
understood in these terms, it is illuminating, not least because it
helps to explain the potential legitimacy of a wide range of
conceptions of what would (in this light) be characterized as
construction. Moreover, it is true that any theory of interpretation
has to be textualist—not in the sense that it must always “follow”
the text, or may never depart from its ordinary meaning, but in
the sense that it must always make the text the foundation for
interpretation. And if interpretation is understood narrowly, to
mean the elicitation of linguistic meaning, then everyone should
agree that courts must engage in it, and that it rules many
approaches out of bounds, not as illegitimate, but as not involving
interpretation at all. For my purposes here, however, the central
problems are that more than one approach can plausibly be
treated as interpretive, and that in many cases, the idea of
construction is doing crucial work. Indeed, we can understand
those who deploy the interpretation/construction distinction as
specifying a particular conception of interpretation—a
conception that is reasonable and useful but by no means
universally shared, and that diverges sharply from (for example)
the conception used by Dworkin. In other words, Solum offers a
narrow and linguistically plausible conception of what counts as
interpretation, but in law, the idea of interpretation is often used
to include what he characterizes as construction (as Solum
acknowledges).
In fact Solum goes further. He argues that “as a matter of
fact, the meaning of a given constitutional provision is fixed at the
68.

See id.
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time of origin by its original public meaning,” and also that “as a
matter of fact, the semantic content makes some contribution to
69
American law.” In his view, “these factual claims are not based
on arguments of political morality,” but instead rest on an
understanding of how “communication through language
70
works.” Solum seeks to “derive conclusions about constitutional
meaning from nonnormative premises—that is, on the basis of
71
premises that are not ethic or moral in nature.” Solum’s defense
of this position is subtle and complex, but it is not clear that an
understanding of “how communication through language works”
can bear the relevant weight. Solum enlists an analogy: If we read
a letter from centuries ago, and if it contains the word “deer,” we
will interpret it by asking about the meaning of that word when
the letter was written, not by consulting modern dictionaries.
(Recall the eighteenth-century meaning of the word “goal.”) That
is true, but is the constitutional setting analogous? Consider the
view that judges should decide, as a matter of principle, whether
current practices do deny people “equal protection of the laws,”
or violate “the freedom of speech,” rather than asking about the
original meaning of those words. Whether that view is right or
wrong is a normative question. It cannot be settled by an
understanding of how communication through language works.
Philosophical work on that topic does not resolve the question of
the appropriate judicial role undertaken under the capacious
rubric of “interpretation.”
III. DECISION COSTS AND ERROR COSTS
Among the permissible alternatives, identification of the
proper approach to constitutional interpretation requires
attention to whether it would make our constitutional order
better or worse. To be a bit more systematic: An approach to the
Constitution might impose two kinds of costs. It might impose
decision costs, by complicating people’s judgments, and it might
impose error costs, by producing bad outcomes.
Without making the ludicrous claim that these ideas should
be understood in purely economic terms, we can insist that judges
should consider the decisional burdens imposed by one or another
approach to the founding document. Those burdens, or costs,
might be faced by judges or by others, including legislators,
69.
70.
71.

Solum, supra note 14, at 8.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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members of the executive branch, and citizens themselves, who
must pay the cost of uncertainty. If courts declared that they
would uphold any legislation unless the constitutional violation
72
were clear, they would certainly lower decision costs, simply
because almost all legislation would be immediately upheld. For
judges, application of a deferential approach is generally
straightforward. Originalists believe that their approach also
lowers decision costs, and in particular that it promotes the rule
73
of law, by increasing clarity and predictability. And to the extent
that minimalism focuses judges narrowly on particular problems,
it too imposes modest decisional burdens—at least in specific
74
cases.
But it is also important to consider the number and the
magnitude of errors. There would be serious reason to question
any approach to the Constitution that would declare race and sex
discrimination to be unobjectionable, or that would raise serious
constitutional doubts about practices that the President and
Congress have accepted for many decades. If an approach would
greatly unsettle current institutional practices, there is reason to
75
question it for that reason alone. If an approach would badly
compromise democratic self-government, it would be
objectionable for that reason, though the intensity of the
objection depends on how we specify the nature and limits of that
76
ideal. And if an approach would eliminate or undermine rights
that Americans enjoy, and deserve to enjoy, then the approach is
questionable on that very ground.
True, reasonable people disagree about whether certain
outcomes count as errors at all. Judges might agree that the choice
among interpretive approaches depends on what approach makes
our constitutional order best, but sharply disagree about how to
answer that question. In my view, a disagreement of this kind
helps to separate people who are committed to different

72. See WILKINSON, supra note 8.
73. See Scalia, supra note 4. For a contrary view, finding that as an empirical matter,
political preferences play a major role in purportedly originalist decisions, see FRANK B.
CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013).
74. One problem with minimalism is that it “exports” costs to subsequent
decisionmakers. See Scalia, supra note 4.
75. Note that Justice Scalia describes himself as a “faint-hearted” originalist, because
he is generally respectful of precedent. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
76. For different views, see EPSTEIN, supra note 55; ELY, supra note 5; DWORKIN,
supra note 6 or 39; BREYER, supra note 10.
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approaches to constitutional interpretation. 77 Nearly everyone
would agree that if an approach is inconsistent with Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., or with Loving v. Virginia, it runs into problems for that
reason. And nearly everyone would agree that if an approach
would license judges to invalidate legislation whenever they liked,
it would be unacceptable for that reason as well. But if one or
another approach would mean that the Constitution protects no
right of privacy, does that count against that approach, or in its
favor? If an approach would reduce constitutional protection of
rights, is that a terrible problem, or might it be not so bad in light
of the possibility (likelihood?) that democratic process would
respect and protect such rights on their own? We can easily
imagine disputes about such questions. Notably, they would have
a significant empirical dimension.
Often there is sufficient agreement to permit diverse people
to engage with one another about appropriate approaches. But it
must be emphasized that some arguments about the appropriate
approach to interpretation are (implicitly) disputes about what
kinds of results count as errors.
IV. POSSIBLE WORLDS
We can go further. No approach to constitutional law makes
78
sense in every imaginable nation or in every possible world. The
argument for any particular approach must depend, in large part,
on a set of judgments about institutional capacities—above all,
about the strengths and weaknesses of legislatures and courts. We
cannot assess decision costs and errors costs without making those
judgments. If judges are excellent and error-free, their excellence
bears on the choice of a theory of interpretation. If judges are
likely to blunder, their fallibility bears on the choice of a theory
of interpretation.
Consider this view, associated with James Bradley Thayer:
Courts should uphold legislation unless it is plainly and
77. There are also, of course, disagreements about the role of intuitions or judgments
about the nature of communication, see Solum, supra note 14, but for reason sketched
above, I do not believe that any position on these issues can justify a unitary view about
interpretation. See in particular the remarks above on the interpretation-construction
distinction.
78. Cf. Waldron, supra note 8, at 1353 (“My argument against judicial review is not
unconditional but depends on certain institutional and political features of modern liberal
democracies.”). See also id. at 1361: “In general, I am assuming that the democratic
institutions are in reasonably good order. They may not be perfect and there are probably
ongoing debates as to how they might be improved. I assume these debates are informed
by a culture of democracy, valuing responsible deliberation and political equality.”
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unambiguously in violation of the Constitution. 79 Few people now
accept Thayer’s position, which has found no support on the
contemporary Supreme Court. Because the Constitution is
frequently ambiguous, Thayer’s approach would require courts to
uphold almost all legislation—including school segregation in the
District of Columbia, sex discrimination in federal employment,
affirmative action, restrictions on abortion, mandatory school
prayer, and much more. In these circumstances, it should be
unsurprising that most judges assert their right to interpret the
Constitution independently, refusing to accept the legislature’s
view merely because the document is ambiguous. In the last halfcentury, no member of the Court has been willing to endorse the
proposition that legislation should be upheld unless the founding
document is entirely clear.
But imagine a society in which democratic processes work
exceedingly fairly and well, so that judicial intervention is almost
never required from the standpoint of anything that really
80
matters. In such a society, racial segregation does not occur.
Political processes are fair, and political speech is never banned.
The legitimate claims of religious minorities and property holders
are respected. The systems of federalism and separation of powers
are safeguarded, and precisely to the right extent, by democratic
institutions.
Imagine too that in this society, judicial judgments are highly
unreliable. From the standpoint of political morality, judges make
systematic blunders when they attempt to give content to
constitutional terms such as “equal protection of the laws” and
“due process of law.” Resolving constitutional questions without
respecting the views of the legislature, courts would make society
worse, because their understandings of rights and institutions are
so bad. In such a society, a Thayerian approach to the
Constitution would make a great deal of sense, and judges should
81
be persuaded to adopt it. These are extreme assumptions, of
79. See Thayer, supra note 3. See also Vermeule, supra note 8.
80. See Waldron, supra note 8, at 1360 (“We are to imagine a society with (1)
democratic institutions in reasonably good working order, including a representative
legislature elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage; (2) a set of judicial institutions,
again in reasonably good order, set up on a nonrepresentative basis to hear individual
lawsuits, settle disputes, and uphold the rule of law; (3) a commitment on the part of most
members of the society and most of its officials to the idea of individual and minority rights;
and (4) persisting, substantial, and good faith disagreement about rights (i.e., about what
the commitment to rights actually amounts to and what its implications are) among the
members of the society who are committed to the idea of rights.”).
81. I put to one side the evident fact that Thayerism cannot be a complete account of
constitutional interpretation. We might agree that courts should strike down statutes only
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course, but even if they are softened significantly, the argument
for a Thayerian approach might be convincing, all things
82
considered.
83
Many people reject the idea of minimalism. But imagine a
society in which the original public meaning of the Constitution is
not so excellent, in the sense that it does not adequately protect
rights, properly understood, and in the sense that it calls for
institutional arrangements (say, between Congress and the
President) that become obsolete over time, as new circumstances
and fresh needs arise. Imagine that in this society, the democratic
process is good but not great, in the sense that it sometimes
produces or permits significant injustices. Suppose finally that in
this society, judges will do poorly if they strike out on their own,
or if they attempt to build doctrine on the basis of high-level
theory, but very well if they build modestly and incrementally on
their own precedents, following something like the common-law
84
method. In such a society, a minimalist approach to the
Constitution would have a great deal to commend it.
Or consider a society in which democratic processes work
poorly, in the sense that they do not live up to democratic ideals,
and also in which political majorities invade fundamental rights—
say, freedom of religion and freedom of speech. Suppose that in
this society, judges are trustworthy, in the sense that they can
make democratic processes work better (say, by safeguarding the
right to vote), and also that they can protect fundamental rights,
as they really should be understood. In such a society, the
argument for democracy-reinforcement, and for moral readings,
would be quite strong.
We should now be able to see that none of these approaches
is ruled out by the Constitution itself. Each can be implemented
in a way that firmly respects the document’s text and attempts to
interpret it. The question is how to do so. If the founding
when the violation of the Constitution is clear; but how do we know when the violation is
clear? To work, Thayerism needs to be supplemented by some kind of account of
constitutional meaning. On an extreme view, Thayerism would mean that courts should
uphold legislation unless it is patently inconsistent with the Constitution on any account of
how to ascertain its meaning.
82. See VERMEULE, supra note 8.
83. See Scalia, supra note 75. Note that minimalism is also an incomplete account of
constitutional interpretation. We might agree that courts should favor small steps and
incompletely theorized rulings; but within those constraints, in what directions shall they
go? By itself, minimalism does not tell us. We could imagine Thayerian minimalists,
originalist minimalists, democracy-reinforcing minimalists, and many others.
84. See STRAUSS, supra note 34.
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document set out the rules for its own interpretation, judges
would be bound by those rules (though any such rules would
themselves need to be construed). But the Constitution sets out
no such rules. For this reason, any approach to the document must
be defended by reference to some account that is supplied by the
interpreter.
The meaning of the Constitution must be made rather than
found, not in the grand (and preposterous) sense that it is entirely
up for grabs, but in the more mundane sense that it must be settled
by an account of interpretation that it does not itself contain. The
idea of interpretation is a capacious one, and a range of
approaches fit within it. Among the reasonable alternatives, any
particular approach to the Constitution must be defended on the
ground that it makes the relevant constitutional order better
rather than worse.

